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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, a simulation framework of analysis is presented aiming at evaluating the safety 
performance of the Residual Heat Removal system (RHRs) of the Chinese High Temperature Gas-
Cooled Reactor – Pebble Bed Modular (HTR-PM) under uncertain operation conditions, and 
components and equipments failures. A transparent and fast model of the passive system has been 
implemented in MATLAB to reproduce the three-interconnected natural circulation trains of the 
RHRs, for removing the residual heat of the reactor core after a reactor shut-down. The model is 
characterized by a one-dimensional mono-phase moving fluid, whose operation is based on 
thermal-hydraulic (T-H) principles. The model is coded into a Monte Carlo (MC) failure engine for 
sampling single and multiple components faults at random times and of random magnitudes. 
Accidental transients of the system are simulated, highlighting equipment contribution to system 
failure. 
Key Words: Passive Safety System, Residual Heat Removal system (RHRs), High Temperature Gas-
Cooled Reactor – Pebble Bed Modular (HTR-PM), Scenario Analysis, Monte Carlo Simulation. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Generation IV reactor systems (e.g., High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors (HTGR)) are 
resorting to the use of passive safety systems, in combination with active safety or operational 
systems. As passive systems do not need external input, especially energy, to operate [IAEA, 1991], 
they are expected to contribute significantly to the improvement of plant safety [Mathews et al., 
2008]. To achieve this, the design of passive systems must be supported by proper modeling and 
simulation. 
In this paper, we consider the Residual Heat Removal system (RHRs) of the Chinese High 
Temperature Reactor-Pebble Modular (HTR-PM) [Zhengy et al., 2008]. The function of this system 
is to remove the residual heat of the reactor core after shut-down. A thermal-hydraulic (T-H) model 
for scenario analysis has been implemented with characteristics of  transparency, for a clear 
interpretation of the system response, and speed of calculation, to allow for extensive scenario 
analysis. 
Figure 1 sketches the elements of scenario analysis, starting from the collection of system 
information and the characteristics of the uncertainties affecting the performance of the system 
function, in terms of plant setting parameters (e.g., power rate), physical condition parameters (e.g., 
temperatures and pressures), and structural and material properties (e.g., friction and roughness of 
pipes). Consideration of uncertainties is fundamental for passive safety systems, because the 
magnitude of the natural forces which drive their operation is small, so that it could be easier for the 
system behavior to be influenced by the uncertainties, and its robustness poorer than for active 
system [Marquès et al., 2005; Pagani et al., 2005]. In the end, the design must guarantee that the 
risk of accidents leading to the dissatisfaction of some of the basic safety functions BSFs (i.e., 
reactivity control, residual heat removal, primary pressure control and containment release) is not 
increased. 
 Figure 1 System scenario analysis 
The model of the RHRs describes a one-dimensional mono-phase moving fluid, based on 
thermal-hydraulic (T-H) principles [Zhengy et al., 2008]. A preliminary sensitivity analysis has 
allowed identifying the most influential parameters affecting the passive system function. These 
parameters have been the focus of the analysis of the system behavior in major accidents, e.g., pipe 
blockage, water pipe rupture and RHR trains isolation. The model is embedded in a MC scheme for 
sampling the uncertain operation condition and single or multiple failures, for an integrated analysis 
of system response. 
The paper organization is as follows. In Section 2, the main system characteristics of the High 
Temperature Reactor-Pebble Modular (HTR-PM) are briefly introduced. The results of a variance 
decomposition sensitivity analysis [McKay, 1996] aimed at identifying the most influential 
parameters for the system function are summarized in Section 3 [Yu et al., 2010a]. Equipment 
malfunctions and deficiencies are identified by HAZOP [Zio, 2007] in Section 4, and representative 
accidental scenarios are simulated, as described in Section 5. Finally, some conclusions are drawn 
in Section 6. 
2 THE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM OF THE HTR-PM 
High-temperature gas-cooled reactors have developed for nearly 50 years. Today’s Chinese 
design of the High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor-Pebble bed Modular (HTR-PM) is based on 
the technology and experiences of the HTR-10 10MW high-temperature gas-cooled test reactor 
(HTR-10) designed in China in 2000. 
In Figure 2, a sketch of the HTR-PM layout is shown. At a first glance, the HTR-PM design has 
the following key technical features [Zhengy et al., 2008]: 
• Uranium dioxide (UO2) fuel kernel coated by tri-isotropic (TRISO) ceramics such as 
pyrolytic carbon and silicon carbide (SiC), in order to retain fission products in the particle 
under a fuel cladding temperature of 1600ºC in accident cases. 
• A one-zone core design is implemented, consisting of approximately 420,000 spherical fuel 
elements in a pebble-bed with a diameter of 3m and an average height of 11m, that are 
charged and discharged in a so-called “multi-pass” mode, which means that before the fuel 
elements reach the discharge burn-up, they go through the reactor core several times. 
• Decay heat in the fuel elements is dissipated by means of heat conduction and radiation to 
the outside of the reactor pressure vessel, and then taken away to the ultimate heat sink, i.e., 
the passive RHRs, by water cooling panels on the surface of the primary concrete cell. 
Therefore, no coolant flow through the reactor core is necessary for decay heat removal in 
case of loss of coolant flow or loss of pressure accidents. 
 
Figure 2 Sketch of HTR-PM 
Figure 3 sketches the equipment layout of one of the 3 trains of the RHR system implemented in 
the HTR-PM: this passive safety system is composed of three circuits dedicated to heat removal, 
each one being connected to a loop in the primary circuit. The model capability is evaluated 
according to the maximum outlet of water cooling temperature 
,w outT  reached during the T-H 
transient; this is the safety parameter with respect to which the success or failure of the system 
function is defined. In fact, from the engineering experience, when 
,w outT  exceeds the critical 
temperature 126cT = [°C] (if 0.3wP = [bar]), local boiling may occur which can significantly 
worsen thermal transmission, driving the system into severe damage failure. 
 
Figure 3 Schematics of 1 train of the RHRs in the HTR-PM [Zhao et al., 2008] 
 
 
 
Legend: 
 
1) Reactor 
2) Vessel 
3) Water cooling wall 
4) Hot water header 
5) Cold water header 
6) Shade 
7) Hot leg 
8) Cold leg 
9) Water tank 
10) Air cooler 
11) Air cooling tower 
12) Inlet shutter 
13) Outlet shutter 
14) Inlet silk net 
15) Outlet silk net 
16) Wind shield 
A one-dimensional mono-phase description of the thermo-hydraulic behavior of the RHRs has 
been implemented in an iterative MATLAB routine and used to simulate normal operation and 
accidental transients. In negligible computational time (compared to the time constants of system 
dynamics), the model allows the calculation of 
,w outT . 
The T-H code models the following steps of the process: 
1. The residual heat radiates from the reactor vessel and other thermal sources to the water in the 
water-cooling wall; 
2. Because of the difference in temperature, natural convection initiates through water, in the 
water-cooling wall and pipes connected with the air-cooling heat exchanger; then, heat is 
transferred to the water side of the heat exchanger; 
3. The heat is transferred by thermal conduction from the water side to the air side of the heat 
exchanger, due to the difference of temperature; 
4. As the air-cooling heat exchanger is located in the air-cooling tower, natural convection of air 
sets up and takes heat to the final heat trap–atmosphere. 
Table 1 reports the 37 parameters identified as most influential for the system function, by expert 
judgment. To account for the associated uncertainties, these are described by probability 
distributions defined on the basis of previous experience and/or information obtained by skilled 
experts. 
N Parameter Distribution Note 
1 W / Residual heat power 
2 Ta,in Seasonal/Daily Temperature of inlet air in the air cooled tower 
3 xi1 Uniform Resistance coefficient of elbow 
4 xi2 Uniform Resistance coefficient of header channel 
5 xiw Uniform Resistance coefficient of the water tank walls 
6 xia,in Uniform Sum of the resistance coefficients of inlet shutter and  air cooling tower and silk net 
7 xia,out Uniform Sum of the resistance coefficients of outlet shutter and  air cooling tower and silk net 
8 xia,narrow Uniform Resistance coefficient of the narrowest part of the tower 
9 Pa,in Seasonal/Daily Pressure of the inlet air in the cooler tower 
10 dx Uniform Roughness of pipes 
11 Ha Normal Height of chimney 
12 La Normal Length of pipes in the exchanger 
13 Na Normal Total number of pipes in the air cooler 
14 Af Normal Air flow crossing are in the narrowest part of the tower 
15 Af,in Normal Inlet air flow crossing area in the tower 
16 Af,out Normal Outlet air flow crossing area from the tower 
17 Af,narrow Normal Crossing area in the narrowest part of the tower 
18 S1 Normal Distance between centers of adjacent pipes in horizontal direction 
19 S2 Normal Distance between centers of adjacent pipes in vertical direction 
20 S Normal Distance between fins in the ribbed pipe 
21 Da Normal Pipes inner diameter in the air cooling exchanger 
22 Do Normal Pipes outer diameter 
23 Douter Normal Rib outer diameter 
24 Pw Normal Water pressure in the pipes 
25 Hw Normal Elevatory height of water 
26 Nw Discrete Normal Number of water cooling pipes for each train 
27 Lw Normal Length of the water cooling pipes 
28 Dw Normal Inner diameter of the water cooling pipes 
29 D1 Normal Inner diameter of the in-core and air cooler connecting pipes 
30 D2 Normal Inner diameter of the in-core header  
31 LC Normal Length of the in-core and air cooler connecting pipes (“cold leg”) 
32 LH Normal Length of the in-core and air cooler connecting pipes (“hot leg”) 
33 Ri Log-normal Thermal resistance of pipes inside of the heat exchanger 
34 Ro Log-normal Thermal resistance due to the dirt of the pipes fins 
35 Rg Log-normal Thermal resistance of the gap between fins 
36 Rf Log-normal Thermal resistance of fins 
37 lamd Normal Heat transfer coefficient of the pipes 
Table 1 Parameters relevant for the behavior of the passive RHRs. 
Air temperature and pressure variability are inferred by historical data ,collected by a 
representative Chinese Automatic Weather Station (CAWS) in different months. For example, a 
typical weather trend for a northern locality of china can be shown in Figures 4 and 5. 
 
Figure 4 Seasonal variation of the mean air 
temperature during one day in different 
months 
 
Figure 5 Seasonal variation of the mean air 
pressure during one day in different months
3 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF THE PASSIVE RHRs MODEL 
In a previous work, the variance decomposition sensitivity analysis method has been adopted to 
assess the impact of uncertainties on the variance of the outlet water temperature 
,w outT  [Yu et al., 
2010a]. The results, supported by an application of the Analytical Hierarchical Process [Yu et al., 
2010b], reveal that the parameters most influential on the uncertainty of 
,w outT  are the power W , the 
air inlet temperature of air in the air-cooled tower 
,a inT  and the water pressure in the pipes wP . This 
occurs because 
,a inT  and wP  directly influence the air cooling capacity and the critical temperature 
c
T , respectively, whereas W  is the heat which is absorbed by the system per unit of time: therefore, 
the smaller is the number of functioning trains, the lower is the overall cooling capacity of the 
system, the more important is the total heat to be absorbed. 
The sensitivity analysis has proceeded to considering the effects of varying simultaneously all 
plant setting parameters (i.e., power W , the number of pipes in the air cooler 
a
N , the number of 
water cooling pipes for each train wN , etc.), physical condition parameters (i.e., water pressure in 
the pipes wP , temperature of air in the air-cooled tower ,a inT , inlet pressure of the air in the air-cooler 
tower 
,a inP , etc.), and structural and material properties (i.e., thermal resistance of pipes inside of the 
heat exchanger iR , thermal resistance due to the dirty of the pipes fins oR , etc.). As suspected from 
the results of the individual inputs, the group of physical configuration parameters is more sensitive 
than either the group of plant setting parameters or the group of structural and material properties.  
Coherently, the following analyses are focused on the inlet air temperature in the air-cooled 
tower 
,a inT , the water pressure in the pipes wP  and the plant setting parameters such as wN , aN and 
,f inA : all these will be sampled for simulating the system response under normal conditions and 
accidental scenarios. 
4 EQUIPMENT FAILURE CHARACTERIZATION 
For the analysis of interest, four deviations which may lead to the functional failure of residual 
heat removal are: 
- Higher water temperature in the water cooling wall 
- Higher water temperature in the inlet of the air cooler 
- Lower air cooling flow in the air cooler 
- Lower pressure in the primary cooling pipes 
An engineering analysis of these situation lead to the identification of four main types of 
equipment failures that can run the system into severe situations. 
- Reduction of the number of air cooling pipes (Na), i.e, pipe blockage 
- Reduction of the number of water cooling wall pipes (Nw), i.e, water pipe rupture 
- The inlet shutters fails partially close, so that Af,in is smaller 
- One of the three trains is isolated for some reason, e.g. maintenance 
5 SIMULATION OF ACCIDENTAL SCENARIOS 
In this Section, the outcomes of the sensitivity and engineering analyses are exploited to define 
the simulation of a number of accidental scenarios. The calculations have been run with the system 
at power 1200W =  [kW] and water pressure in the pipes 0.3wP =  [bar], under sampled conditions of 
the variables initial inlet air temperature and initial air pressure in the air-cooled tower, 
,a inT  and 
,a inP , respectively [Yu et al, 2010a; Yu et al., 2010b]. 
A Monte Carlo (MC) sampling procedure has been developed for injecting equipment faults at 
random times and of random magnitudes in the RHRs. The set of faults considered are: 
• A random number of air pipes in the air cooler (10) for train 1/2/3 fails stuck/broken at time 
t1/2/3 in [1,2880] [min], so that the total number of pipes in each air cooler is equal to 1/ 2 / 3aN . 
• The inlet shutter (12) of the air cooling tower (11) for train 1/2/3 fails stuck at time t4/5/6 in 
[1,2880] [min], providing a corresponding air flow crossing area 1/ 2 / 3
,f inA  in each tower. 
• A random number of water cooling pipes (3) for train 1/2/3 fails stuck/broken at time t7/8/9 in 
[1,2880] [min], so that the total number of pipes in each air cooler 1/ 2 / 3wN . 
• One of the three trains is unavailable at time t10 in [1,2880] [min]. 
For exemplification, we comment on two of the scenarios simulated. In accidental transient 1, 
the set of failures in Table 2 have been randomly sampled to occur. The 
,w outT  evolution during the 
life time of 48 [h] (2880 [min]) is plotted in Figures 6-8 for train 1, 2 and 3, respectively; for 
comparison, the 
,w outT  evaluated in nominal conditions is also reported (dashed-dotted line). 
At time 240 [min], a sudden unavailability of a number of air pipes in the first train causes an 
increase of the temperature of the coolant in all the trains, that have to endorse the load of more heat 
removal proportionally to their capabilities: in fact, the temperature of trains 2 and 3 increases much 
more than for train 1, whose heat capacity has degraded due to the water pipe rupture. At time 1140 
[min], the inlet shutter of train 3 fails partially closed: 
,w outT  of trains 1 and 2 increase significantly, 
whereas the 
,w outT  of train 3 decreases, because of its abrupt decrease in heat capacity, i.e., pipe 
blockage. Shortly after, at time 1200 [min], train 3 goes out of service. Subsequently, the water 
temperature in train 3 drops to 
,a inT , reaching the temperature of the cold sink of the air-water 
exchanger in the air cooler tower, whereas a sharp increase of 
,w outT  is recorded in trains 1 and 2. 
The maximum value of 
,w outT  is reached in train 2, because all its components and equipments are 
available along all the system life, so that less resistances are present in this train allowing for a 
larger heat exchange. In this accidental transient, the system is still able to react to components and 
equipments failures without exceeding the threshold cT . 
Month April 
Simulation start time 22.00 
Time of 
occurrence 
[min] Type of failure 
Magnitude 
of failure 
t1 240 1aN  200 
t2 / 2aN  / 
t3 / 3aN  / 
t4 / 1 ,f inA  / 
t5 / 2,f inA  / 
t6 1140 3 ,f inA  8.53 
t7 / 1wN  / 
t8 / 2wN  / 
t9 / 3aN  / 
t10 1200 Failed train Yes 
Table 2 Failures in the accidental sequence 1 
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Figure 6 Evolution of the outlet water 
temperature in RHR train 1. 
 
 
The number  of air 
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Figure 7 Evolution of the outlet water 
temperature in RHR train 2. 
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Figure 8 Evolution of the outlet water 
temperature in RHR train 3. 
In accidental scenario 2, 
,w outT  exceeds cT  because the components and equipments states are 
such to limit the heat transfer capacity, so that the heat decay is larger than the heat releasable to the 
heat-trap atmosphere. The set of failures characteristic of this scenario are listed in Table 3. The 
,w outT  evolution during the life time of 48 [h] (2880 [min]) is plotted in Figures 9-11 for trains 1, 2 
and 3, respectively; for comparison, the 
,w outT  evaluated in nominal conditions is also reported 
(dashed-dotted line). 
Month April 
Simulation start time 22.00 
Time of 
occurrence 
[min] Type of failure 
Magnitude 
of failure 
t1 240 1aN  100 
t2 1380 2aN  200 
t3 / 3aN  / 
t4 480 1 ,f inA  6.0 
t5 960 2,f inA  7.0 
t6 1140 3 ,f inA  8.0 
t7 970 1wN  80 
t8 1260 2wN  70 
t9 / 3aN  / 
t10 1800 Failed train Yes 
Table 3 Failures in the accidental sequence 2 
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Figure 9 Evolution of the outlet water 
temperature in RHR train 1. 
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Figure 10 Evolution of the outlet water 
temperature in RHR train 2. 
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Figure 11 Evolution of the outlet water 
temperature in RHR train 3. 
Like in accident scenario 1, at time 240 [min], a sudden failure of a number of air pipes in the 
first train causes an increase of the temperature of the coolant in all the trains, that have to remove a 
greater amount of heat proportionally to their capacities: in fact, the temperature of trains 2 and 3 
increases much more than for train 1, whose heat capacity has degraded due to the water pipe 
rupture. At time 480 [min], the inlet shutter of train 1 fails partially closed: while 
,w outT  of train 1 
decreases following the 
,a inT  trend, ,w outT  reductions in trains 2 and 3 is less significant. The 
subsequent failure of the inlet shutter of train 2, at time 960 [min] determines a mild increase of 
,w outT . Shortly after, at time 970 [min], the number of water cooling pipes in train 1 decreases, so 
that a more relevant increase of 
,w outT  is visible. The successive components failures continue 
degrading the heat transfer capacity of the air cooler, so that the deviation from the temperature 
nominal behavior (dashed-dotted line in Figures 9-11) increases. The failure of train 3 at time 1800 
[min] drives the system into failure, i.e., 
,w outT  exceeds cT . 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have developed a simulation framework for analyzing a three-trains passive 
Residual Heat Removal system (RHRs) of the Chinese High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor – 
Pebble Bed Modular (HTR-PM). A T-H model is coded into a MC sampling scheme which 
The number  of air 
pipes has decreased 
The inlet shutter area 
has decreased 
The number  or water 
cooling pipes has 
decreased 
Train 3 is out of service 
The inlet shutter area 
has decreased 
simulated realizations of both the uncertain operation conditions, and the components and 
equipments failures. The simulations allow capturing the dependence of the system response on the 
time and magnitude of components and equipments failures, under uncertain conditions of 
operation. 
Transparency of the model allows understanding of the influence of the uncertainties and of 
components and equipments failures on the system function. Accuracy and speed of calculation 
allow the required coverage of scenarios for safety. 
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